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This is an unedited version. Edited version forthcoming in: E. Bribosia & I. Rorive (eds.), A Global 
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(Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland: Intersentia, 2017). 
 
Just before Christmas 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) unexpectedly put a stop 
to the EU’s accession to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). It declared the agreement 
on the accession of the EU to the ECHR to be incompatible with the specific characteristics and 
autonomy of EU law in Opinion 2/13.2 This Opinion reflects the increasing worries of the CJEU about 
the sometimes far-reaching case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which could 
hamper the effectiveness of EU law.3 This tension has become especially visible in the Area for Freedom 
Security and Justice in cases dealing with the Dublin Regulation and the European Arrest Warrant. 
While the CJEU has to balance the uniformity, primacy and effectiveness of EU law and the upholding 
of the system based on mutual trust and mutual recognition with fundamental rights concerns, the 
ECtHR’s sole objective is to guarantee the latter. CJEU judges expressed their concern that the ECtHR  
does not always take the particularities of EU law, such as mutual trust in the context of the Dublin 
system, sufficiently into account, because some Strasbourg judges are not familiar with them.4 There 
has also been growing uneasiness in Luxembourg with the intrusive case law of the ECtHR in relation 
to the preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 TFEU. This is because the ECtHR found violations 
of Article 6 ECHR in Dhahbi and Schipani for the failure of the highest Italian court to provide a 
statement of reasons for its refusal to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the basis of Article 
267 TFEU.5 Similar frustration exists in Strasbourg vis-à-vis the CJEU and especially Opinion 2/13, 
which was not received warmly. Former President of the ECtHR, Spielmann, stated that it was ‘a great 
                                                 
1 I would like to thank Leonie Huijbers, Tobias Lock and Bruno de Witte for their valuable comments on earlier versions of 
this chapter. 
2 Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
3 T LOCK, ‘The future of the European Union’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights after Opinion 2/13: is 
it still possible and is it still desirable?’ (2015) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 239, 259; X GROUSSOT, J HETTNE and 
G T PETURSSON, ‘General principles and the many faces of coherence: Between law and ideology in the European Union’, in: 
Studies of the Oxford Institute of European and Comparative Law, Hart 2016. 
4 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, ‘The use of ECtHR case law by the Court of Justice after Lisbon: the view of 
Luxembourg Insiders’ (2015) 6 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 812, 831. The ECtHR has, however, 
recently held in Avotiņš that it is ‘mindful of the importance’ of mutual recognition mechanisms and mutual trust, but at the 
same time showed that it is willing to scrutinise EU measures based on these mechanisms in-depth. Avotiņš v. Latvia, no. 
17502/07, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0523JUD001750207, para. 113. L GLAS and J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx. 
5 The case law of the ECtHR on Article 267 TFEU seems to change the nature of the preliminary reference procedure from a 
mechanism of inter-judicial cooperation to a mechanism safeguarding the individual right to a fair trial. In doing so, the ECtHR 
is intruding with the ‘specific characteristics and the autonomy of EU law’. These fears are, however, slightly exaggerated, as 
argued in J KROMMENDIJK, ‘“Open sesame!” Improving access to the CJEU by obliging national courts to reason their refusals 
to refer’ (2017) 1 European Law Review 46. 
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disappointment’ and held that the ‘the onus will be on the Strasbourg Court to do what it can in cases 
before it to protect citizens from the negative effects of this situation’.6 Against this background it is not 
surprising that the official contacts between the CJEU and ECtHR were only resumed in March 2016 
when a delegation of the ECtHR visited the CJEU.7 During this visit, judges of both courts talked about 
the two challenging issues identified above: the preliminary ruling procedure and the Dublin System in 
the light of the ECHR.8  
These tensions warrant the question as to whether Opinion 2/13 has led to a changing dialogue 
or interaction between both courts. Before Opinion 2/13 academics and scholars alike championed the 
practice of extensive ‘cross-fertilisation’ and ‘parallel interpretation’.9 By contrast, the developments 
sketched above seem to suggest that we might have entered a new period of increasing tensions between 
both courts. Opinion 2/13 could easily be interpreted as an illustration of the increasing alleingang of 
the CJEU whereby the CJEU primarily tries to come up with its own autonomous interpretation on the 
basis of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, thereby sidelining the ECHR and the case law of 
ECtHR.10 This has also been the perception in Strasbourg. The 2016 report on the future of the ECHR 
of the Steering Committee for Human Right referred to ‘growing importance of the Charter [...] to the 
detriment of the Convention’.11 There is also a ‘corridor joke’ in the CJEU that Strasbourg is almost 
begging the Court of Justice to cite it.12  
But is it truly so that the CJEU has begun to cite the ECtHR less often and in different ways 
since Opinion 2/13? This chapter examines the case law of the CJEU after Opinion 2/13 in order to 
identify how the CJEU has dealt with the jurisprudence from Strasbourg and whether there has been a 
marked change since Opinion 2/13. This chapter will build on earlier published work examining the 
interaction between both European (human rights) systems.13 An earlier article  focused on the way in 
which the case law of the ECtHR was used by CJEU judges, Advocates-General (AGs) and référendaires 
                                                 
6 ECtHR, Annual report 2014. <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_Report_2014_ENG.pdf>, p. 6. The ECtHR (Grand 
Chamber), nonetheless, recently upheld its Bosphorus doctrine despite assertions in the literature that it might choose to drop 
it in the light of Opinion 2/13. See Avotiņš v. Latvia, no. 17502/07, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0523JUD001750207. For a full 
discussion of this judgment, see L GLAS and J KROMMENDIJK, ‘From Opinion 2/13 to Avotiņš: Recent Developments in the 
Relationship between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Court’ (2017) 2 Human Rights Law Review. 
7 President of the ECtHR Spielmann held in October 2015 that official contacts had yet to resume. D SPIELMANN, ‘Whither 
judicial dialogue’, Sir Thomas More lecture Lincoln’s Inn, 12 October 2015. 
8 They also had a general discussion about the recent case law of both courts. See CJEU, ‘A delegation from the European 
Court of Human Rights visits the Court of Justice of the European Union’, Press release no. 25/16, 7 March 2016, 
<curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2016-03/cp160025en.pdf>. 
9 F G JACOBS, ‘Judicial dialogue and the cross-fertilization of legal systems: the European Court of Justice’ (2003) Texas 
International Law Journal 547; Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, 24 January 2011, 
<curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf>,  para. 1. 
10 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 87. Some Advocates General have also been relatively 
open about the need for an autonomous interpretation. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Case C-465/07, 
Elgafaji, ECLI:EU:C:2008:479, para. 19-20; Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón in Case C-69/10, Samba Diouf, 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:102, para. 39.  
11 STEERING COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (CDDH), ‘Report on the longer-term future of the system of the European 
Convention on Human Rights’, CM(2015)176-add1final, 3 February 2016, para. 179.   
12 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, p 826. 
13 This chapter is partly based on earlier work with a more limited time period until June 2016 (in Dutch); J KROMMENDIJK, 
‘Het Hof van Justitie van de EU en de rechtspraak van het EHRM sinds Advies 2/13. Een toenemende alleingang en autonome 
aanpak?’ (2016) 8 Asiel & Migrantenrecht, 356-361; See also L GLAS and J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx. 
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on the basis of twenty interviews with these Luxembourg insiders.14 This chapter will reflect on these 
findings on the basis of a structured legal analysis of CJEU judgments following the 2.5 years after 
Opinion 2/13.15   
It is not easy to answer the central research question with great certainty, also given the short 
period of time that has lapsed since Opinion 2/13. In addition, examining from a more quantitative view 
whether Opinion 2/13 has resulted in a lower number of references to ECtHR does not tell very much, 
especially for such a short period of time.16 This is also because the CJEU has no control over its case 
docket and the number of references to ECtHR also depend on the number of fundamental rights relates 
cases that reach the CJEU in the first place. It is thus only possible to come up with some tentative 
observations and trends. Time will tell whether those trends will also result in a more solid practice. 
This chapter starts with a short sketch of the legal framework as to the relevance of the ECHR 
and judgments of the ECtHR for the EU legal order and the CJEU. Section 2 provides a typology of 
different ways in which the CJEU has referred to the ECtHR or refrained from doing so. The concluding 
section 3 reflects on the main research question as to whether Opinion 2/13 has been a game changer or 
not and what the implications of the CJEU’s case law are for future accession of the EU to the ECHR. 
 
1. Legal framework17 
Before examining the actual practice of reliance on the case law of the ECtHR, it is important to pay 
attention to the legal framework governing the relevance of the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR 
for the EU. The EU is not yet legally bound to comply with the ECHR nor the judgments of the ECtHR. 
In Åkerberg Fransson and Kamberaj the CJEU determined that the ECHR ‘does not constitute, as long 
as the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has been formally incorporated 
into European Union law’.18 The CJEU has reiterated this postulation post-Opinion 2/13 in several 
judgments, such as Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and J.N..19 The CJEU suggested in Opinion 2/13 that the 
ECtHR’s interpretation of the ECHR is only binding upon the EU after the EU’s accession to the ECHR, 
                                                 
14 J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx. 
15 These judgments were found by searching curia with references to the “European Court of Human Rights” in the period 
between 19 December 2014 and 19 June 2017 for the Court of Justice only, thereby excluding the General Court and the Civil 
Service Tribunal from the analysis. This led to 138 documents in 98 different cases, including judgments/ orders or AG 
Opinions. All these documents were examined and AG Opinions were compared with the CJEU judgments in the respective 
cases.  
16 Two examples of more quantitative approaches are De Búrca, who examined the period between 2009 and 2012 and found 
less references to the ECtHR. In addition, Eckes found more references to the ECHR (the Convention instead of the ECtHR) 
in the period between 2010-2012 than in the period between 2007-2009. G DE BÚRCA, ‘After the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights: The Court of Justice as a Human Rights Adjudicator’ (2013) Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 
168, 174-176; C ECKES, ‘The Court of Justice’s participation in the judicial discourse: theory and practice’, in M. Cremona and 
A THIES (eds), The European Court of Justice and External Relations - Constitutional Challenges, Hart 2014. 
17 This section is for a large part based on J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, p 814-816. 
18 Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 44; Case C-571/10 Kamberaj, ECLI:EU:C:2012:233, para. 
60. 
19 Case C-398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ECLI:EU:C:2015:535, para. 45; Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N., ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, 
para. 45. 
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even though there was (and still is) some discussion as to whether this is really the case.20 In sum, at the 
moment, the EU is not (yet) bound by the ECHR and the ECtHR. 
This is, however, not the full story. As the CJEU emphasised in several cases as well, Article 
6(3) TEU confirms that fundamental rights recognised by the ECHR constitute general principles of EU 
law.21 In addition, it noted that Article 52(3) requires that ECHR-corresponding rights in the Charter are 
given the same meaning and scope as those laid down by the ECHR.22 Article 52(3) does, however, not 
refer to the case law of the ECtHR. This was intentionally left out in order to safeguard the autonomy 
of the CJEU.23 Only the Explanations to Article 52(3) make a reference to the ECtHR. The Explanations 
stipulate that: ‘the meaning and the scope of the guaranteed rights are determined not only by the text 
of those instruments, but also by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights’. The Explanations 
are, however, not legally binding, but should only ‘be given due regard’ to on the basis of Articles 52(7) 
of the Charter and 6(1) TEU. There are, however, some early Charter cases in which the CJEU seemed 
to interpret Article 52(3) more broadly and attached more legal value to the case law of the ECtHR. In 
McB the CJEU, for example held that the Charter must ‘be given the same meaning and the same scope 
as Article 8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights’.24 
Since Opinion 2/13, the CJEU has been more nuanced and has held that Article 52(3) merely obliges 
the CJEU to ‘take into consideration’ case law of the ECtHR when interpreting the Charter which 
reflects more an obligation of conduct.25 Nonetheless, in some judgments, including WebMindLicenses 
                                                 
20 Opinion 2/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para. 185; During the hearings in the context of Opinion 2/13 there was ‘extensive 
discussion’ as to whether the CJEU –after accession of the EU to the ECHR- could refuse to recognise judgments of the ECtHR 
where these conflict with the constitutional identity of the EU or where they are ultra vires. See AG Kokott in Opinion 2/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475, para. 167-171. The CJEU seemed to imply that such situations might indeed occur, because it held 
that ‘it should not be possible for the ECtHR to call into question the Court’s finding in relation to the scope ratione materiae 
of EU law’. Opinion 2/13, para. 186. Note that even following accession, the CJEU is still not formally bound to the entire case 
law of the ECtHR, since Article 46(1) ECHR stipulates that judgments are binding inter partes (res judicata). In addition, 
judgment are declaratory in nature. AG Kokott in Opinion 2/13, paras. 78 and 123. See also Kadi I in which the CJEU held 
that UN Security Council Resolutions cannot derogate from the ‘very foundations of the Community legal order’ and cannot 
have primacy over general principles of EU law. Joined Cases 402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461 paras. 
304-308. ECtHR judgments are at the same time considered to have res interpretata, which means that an interpretation of the 
ECHR by the ECtHR that can be generalised beyond the concrete case is part of the ECHR and because of that binding on 
State Parties. A BODNAR, ‘Res Interpretata: Legal Effect of the European Court of Human Rights’ Judgments for other States 
Than Those Which Were Party to the Proceedings’ (2014) Ius Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 223. 
21 E.g. Tapiriit Kanatami  and J.N. De Witte argued on the basis of Article 6(3) TEU that the EU is already bound by the ECHR 
without accession of the EU to the ECHR. B DE WITTE, ‘The use of the ECHR and Convention case law by the European Court 
of Justice’, in P POPELIER et al. (eds), Human rights protection in the European legal order: the interaction between the 
European and the national courts, Intersentia, Cambridge 2011, pp 17-34, 21-22. 
22 Article 52(3) provides: ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those 
laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ Advocate 
General Kokott labeled Article 52(3) of the Charter as a ‘homogeneity clause’. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case 
C-109/10 P, Solvay v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:686, para. 252.  
23 S DOUGLAS-SCOTT, ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights after Lisbon’, in 
S DE VRIES et al. (eds), The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU after Lisbon, Hart 2013, pp 153-179, 163.  
24 Case C-400/10 PPU, McB, ECLI:EU:C:2010:582, para. 53; C-279/09 DEB ECLI:EU:C:2010:811, para. 35. The CJEU 
determined in Arango Jaramillo that ‘reference must be made’ to the case law of the ECtHR in accordance with Article 52(3) 
of the Charter. Case C-334/12 RX-II, Arango Jaramillo and others v. EIB, ECLI:EU:C:2013:134, para. 43.  
25 Case C-239/14, Tall, ECLI:EU:C:2015:824, para. 54; Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N., ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, para. 44; Case 
C-398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ECLI:EU:C:2015:535, para. 61. 
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and Toma, the CJEU followed and explicitly cited the seemingly more far-ranging McB reading of 
Article 52(3) and framed more in terms of an obligation of result.26  
 The CJEU has become more reluctant to attach importance to the case law of the ECtHR from 
a formal point of view in other respects as well. Before December 2014, the CJEU already held several 
times that: ‘Article 47 of the Charter secures in EU law the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the 
ECHR. It is necessary, therefore, to refer only to Article 47’.27 The CJEU later applied this logic to other 
Charter provisions in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami II when it held that it was appropriate for the General 
Court to solely examine the validity of the basic regulation on the basis of Articles 17, 7, 10 and 11 of 
the Charter.28 In J.N., the CJEU added that the review of the validity of EU secondary law ‘must be 
undertaken solely in the light of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter’.29 With this 
conclusion, the CJEU went further than its previous case law in two respects. Firstly, by using such 
demanding language (‘must’) and, secondly, by referring to the Charter in general without signalling 
out specific provisions. So it is no longer only Article 47 of the Charter, that has a wider scope than the 
ECHR, that could (and must!) be interpreted autonomously, but also provisions that have the same scope 
and meaning as ECHR provisions.30  
 The CJEU also downplayed the relevance of Article 52(3) in J.N. in another way. It emphasised 
that consistency between the Charter and the ECHR should be sought ‘without thereby adversely 
affecting the autonomy of Union law and ... that of the Court of Justice of the European Union’. J.N. 
was the first time that the CJEU quoted this sentence from the Explanations to Article 52(3), which 
clearly echoes the tone of Opinion 2/13.31 The CJEU subsequently determined that ‘an EU measure must 
be interpreted, as far as possible, in such a way as not to affect its validity and in conformity with primary 
law as a whole and, in particular, with the provisions of the Charter’. J.N. is thus a good recent example 
of so-called ‘Charter-centrism’ which places the Charter centre stage.32 It also reflects a wish among 
CJEU judges and référendaires that the importance, the autonomy and the higher level of protection of 
the EU’s ‘own catalogue’ should be underlined by citing Strasbourg less often.33  
                                                 
26 Case C-205/15, Toma, ECLI:EU:C:2016:499, para. 41; Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, para. 
70. Note that AG Wathelet merely held in this case that ‘reference should be made’ to the ECtHR case law which ‘could be 
useful’. Opinion of AG Wathelet in Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2015:606, paras. 110 and 113. 
27 E.g. Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2011:815, para. 51; Case C-199/11, Otis and others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, para. 47; Case C-396/11, Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39, para. 32.  
28 Case C-398/13 P,  Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ECLI:EU:C:2015:535, para. 46 
29 Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N., ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, para. 46.  
30 Article 47 offers more protection than Article 13 and 6(1) ECHR since Article 47(1) protects the right to an effective remedy 
before a court and because the right to a fair hearing in Article 47(2) is not confined to civil law disputes. For an overview of 
Charter articles corresponding to or with a wider scope than the ECHR, see the Explanations to the Charter. (2007/C 303/02), 
17-18. 
31 Note that the CJEU already held in Elgafaji in relation to Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive that it ‘is a provision, 
the content of which is different from that of Article 3 of the ECHR, and the interpretation of which must, therefore, be carried 
out independently, although with due regard for fundamental rights, as they are guaranteed under the ECHR’. C-465/07, 
Elgafaji, ECLI:EU:C:2009:94, para. 28. 
32 K LENAERTS and J A GUTIÉRREZ FONS, ‘The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice’, in S PEERS et al. (eds), 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary, Hart 2014, pp 1559-1593, margin note 55.26; S IGLESIAS SÁNCHEZ, 
‘The Court and the Charter: The impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to fundamental 
rights’ (2012) Common Market Law Review 1565, 1601.  
33 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 832 
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 Since J.N. conflicting judgment have been rendered in which the CJEU reflected explicitly on 
the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR as well as Article 52(3). Some judgments repeated 
several of the considerations of J.N. and the ‘must … solely’ interpret logic.34 Several others, however, 
took a more ECHR-friendly approach, some of those referring to McB or DEB instead.35 It is not entirely 
clear how both strands fit together, but it seems that the J.N. approach is more dominant, also because 
this was a judgment of the Grand Chamber while the others were not. In addition, the more restricted 
interpretation of Article 52(3) which only obliges to ‘take into account’ the case law of the ECtHR is 
consistent with the interviews with Luxembourg insiders who tended to exclude any formal legal binding 
force given to ECtHR judgments.36 
 
2. A post-Opinion 2/13 typology of the practice of citing Strasbourg  
Despite the formal reluctance to acknowledge the case law of the ECtHR, the CJEU has continued citing 
the ECtHR, even in Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami II and J.N. in which the CJEU was particularly dismissive 
about the need to rely on Strasbourg.37 This section provides an overview of CJEU judgments which 
referred or could have referred to the case law of the ECtHR. It will distinguish between five categories: 
extensive reliance on Strasbourg (section 2.1), (passing) references to the ECtHR (section 2.2), 
references to the ECtHR as afterthought (section 2.3), CJEU judgments without any references to the 
ECtHR (section 2.4) and CJEU judgments which do not engage with (the Charter of) fundamental rights 
at all (section 2.5). The last two types of CJEU judgment were primarily identified on the basis of the 
references to the ECtHR in the judgments and opinions found in Curia, either done by AGs, (one of) 
the parties and/or the referring court.38 
As the rest of this section shows as well, the CJEU tends to refer to Strasbourg when this is 
strictly necessary, because there is a tendency to keep judgments as short as possible and there is an 
emphasis on solving the dispute.39 This idea is, for example, visible in the Opinion of AG Kokott in 
Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami II, who dismissed the applicants’ ECHR argument on the grounds that they 
failed to explain the ‘additional benefit’ for considering the ECHR. She implied that a reference to the 
ECHR would only be warranted if the ECHR is imposing higher requirements than the Charter.40  
 
2.1. Extensive reliance on Strasbourg 
                                                 
34 Case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige AB, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, paras. 127-129; Case C-218/15, Paoletti, ECLI:EU:C:2016:748, 
para. 22. 
35 Case C-205/15, Toma, ECLI:EU:C:2016:499, para. 41; Case C-294/16 PPU, JZ, ECLI:EU:C:2016:610, paras. 48-50; Case 
C-528/15, Al Chodor, ECLI:EU:C:2017:213, para. 37. 
36 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 816. 
37 In Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami II, the CJEU cited two judgments of the ECtHR to support its conclusion that future income cannot 
be considered possessions, ‘unless it has already been earned, it is definitively payable or there are specific circumstances that 
can cause the person concerned to entertain a legitimate expectation of obtaining an asset’. Case C-398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit 
Kanatami, ECLI:EU:C:2015:535, para. 61. For J.N., see below n xx. 
38 See above n xx for a description of the performed database search. 
39 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 825-829. 
40 Case C-398/13 P,  Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ECLI:EU:C:2015:190, paras. 69-70  
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There are several post-Opinion 2/13 judgments in which the case law of the ECtHR figures rather 
prominently. Two judgments, Aranyosi and C.K. stand out in particular, because the CJEU changed its 
approach, as set out in the introduction, in relation to the principle of mutual trust and the protection of 
individuals against inhuman and degrading. While in earlier judgments, the CJEU seemed to prioritize 
the former by only accepting that fundamental rights can rebut the presumption of mutual trust ‘in 
exceptional circumstances’, it seems to have realized that mutual trust is very much depended on the 
proper protection of fundamental rights.41 In Aranyosi, the CJEU opted for a more fundamental rights 
consistent reading of the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) by concluding 
that the execution of a EAW must be suspended if there is a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment 
for the individual concerned because of deficient detention conditions in the requesting Member States.42 
This ran counter to the heavily criticised opinion of AG Bot who prioritised mutual trust and did not 
refer to Article 52(3) and tried everything he could to stay within the confines of the EAW system and 
the limited grounds for non-execution.43 On the basis of the case law of ECtHR, the CJEU went even so 
far as to accept a ‘positive obligation’ to ensure that prison conditions are in line with fundamental 
rights.44 It is one of the very few judgments in which the CJEU subscribed in such explicit terms to an 
important doctrine developed by the ECtHR.45 Relying on Aranyosi and a considerable number of 
judgments of the ECtHR, the CJEU also opted for a more fundamental rights and ECHR friendly 
interpretation of the Dublin III Regulation in C.K..46 Just like Aranyosi, the CJEU again took a different 
stance than the AG, Tanchev, who explicitly held that the CJEU is not required to follow the approach 
of the ECtHR.47 While the CJEU was only willing to admit the possibility for national courts to refuse 
to return an asylum seeker to the Member State in case of ‘systemic flaws’ in the asylum procedure and 
in the reception conditions in N.S., it now considered the individual risks for the asylum seeker to be 
decisive.48 The CJEU thus accepted ‘any circumstance other than’ those systemic deficiencies, including 
those related to the state of health of the asylum seeker. In reaching this conclusion, the CJEU relied on 
the judgment of the ECtHR of two months earlier in Paposhvili dealing with the positive obligations of 
states to prevent refoulement of severely ill persons.49  
                                                 
41 C RIZCALLAH, ‘The Dublin system: the ECJ squares the circle between mutual trust and human rights protection’, 20 February 
2017, EU Law Analysis. 
42 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, paras. 86-91. 
43 See e.g. FAIR TRIALS, ‘AG’s Bot Opinion in Aranyosi and Căldăraru. A threat to justice in Europe, <www.fairtrials.org/wp-
content/uploads/160310-Jourov%C3%A1.pdf?platform=hootsuite>.  
44 Ibid., para. 90. 
45 For an earlier precedent, see C-540/03, European Parliament v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2006:429, paras. 54, 60 and 62. 
46 C RIZCALLAH, above n xx.  
47 The CJEU held that the case law of the ECtHR ‘must be taken into account’. Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K., 
ECLI:EU:C:2017:127, para. 68; AG Tanchev in Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K., ECLI:EU:C:2017:108, para. 53. 
48 N.S. (and subsequent judgments such as Abdullahi and Kaveh Puid) were earlier criticized exactly on this point, because the 
CJEU came up with a (seemingly) more restrictive requirement of ‘systemic flaws’, which was considered to be at odds with 
the approach of the ECtHR in relation to article 3 ECHR for whom individual circumstances alone matter. M DEN HEIJER, Case 
Note on NS (2012) Common Market Law Review 1735, 1747. Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. See, however, K LENAERTS, ‘La vie après l’Avis: Exploring the principle of mutual (yet not blind) trust’ 
(2017) Common Market Law Review 805, 832. 
49 Paposhvili v. Belgium, no. 41738/10, CE:ECHR:2016:1213JUD004173810, paras. 174 and 175. 
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In WebMindLicenses, the CJEU is also very indebted to Strasbourg, at least in some parts of the 
judgment. After quoting the more Strasbourg friendly McB reading of Article 52(3), the CJEU cited no 
less than seven ECtHR judgments to supports its finding that the interception of telecommunications and 
seizure of emails constitutes an interference with Article 8 ECHR and consequently ‘also’ a limitation 
of the corresponding right laid down in Article 7 of the Charter.50 In addition, it also cited five Strasbourg 
judgments to underline that the absence of a prior judicial authorisation to obtain certain evidence must 
be compensated by a strict legal framework and procedural safeguards against arbitrary interferences 
and/ or effective ex post review.51 Without saying that the CJEU should have foregone a reference to 
Strasbourg, it is unclear why the CJEU felt it necessary to rely so extensively on the ECtHR and needed 
to quote so many judgments, also when comparing this judgment with other in which the CJEU did not 
make any references to the ECtHR (see section 2.4). With respect to the interception, the CJEU could 
simply have relied on its own extensive case law in the field of data protection, such as Digital Rights 
or Schrems.52 In relation to judicial authorisation a reference to Deutsche Bahn (discussed below) would 
have seemed appropriate (or sufficient) as well.53 In addition, the CJEU was not very consistent in its 
broad use of Strasbourg (see section 2.2. on the selective use of the ECtHR). With respect to the 
subsequent issue as to whether the transmission of the evidence by the criminal investigation department 
to the tax authorities, the CJEU held that only natural persons can invoke the protection of Article 8 of 
the Charter. This is contrary to the Opinion of AG Wathelet who relied on the case law of the ECtHR 
(and also the CJEU) suggesting that legal persons can also rely on Article 8 of the Charter and Article 8 
ECHR.54 Nor did the CJEU (and the AG) justify its approach as to the use of evidence, which was 
obtained in violation of EU law and the Charter. This is surprising because the CJEU is considerably 
more strict from the point of view of fundamental rights protection than the ECtHR. It held, without 
reference to any precedent, that decisions based on wrongfully obtained evidence must simply be 
annulled.55 By contrast, the ECtHR only requires such an outcome when the infringement of privacy 
also violates the right to a fair trial as laid down in Article 6 ECHR.56  
                                                 
50 Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, paras. 70-72. 
51 Ibid., paras. 77-78. 
52 See, however, Case C-203/15, Tele2 Sverige AB, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, paras. 127-129; C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital 
Rights Ireland and Others,EU:C:2014:238; C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:627. 
53 M FIERSTRA, case note on Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft., European Human Rights Cases 2016/107. This judgment 
is obviously different since it deals with the Commission investigatory powers in the EU competition law context under 
Regulation 1/2003. Nonetheless, the CJEU subscribed more generally to the ECtHR approach in Société Colas Est. Case C-
583/13 P, Deutsche Bahn and others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:404, paras. 17-37. 
54 Contrast Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, para. 79 with Opinion of AG Wathelet in Case 
C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2015:606, paras. 111-112. The CJEU referred to Volker as a relevant precedent, 
but the AG noted that subsequent judgments of the CJEU, such as Digital Rights, point in a different direction. C-92/09 and 
C93/09, Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras. 52-53; C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights 
Ireland and Others,EU:C:2014:238, paras. 32-37. 
55 Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft., ECLI:EU:C:2015:832, para. 89. Fierstra criticised this limited reasoning also in the 
light of the principle of procedural autonomy, which the CJEU does not mention in this context either. M FIERSTRA, above n 
xx. 
56 Bykov v. Russia, no. 4378/02, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2009:0310JUD000437802, para. 89; Rywin v. Poland, nos. 6091/06, 4047/07 
and 4070/07, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2016:0218JUD000609106, para. 72; ECtHR, P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, no. 44787/98, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2001:0925JUD004478798, para. 34. 
9 
 
There are several other good examples of cases in which the CJEU relies relatively extensively 
on the ECtHR which are worth to mention shortly. In Deutsche Bahn, the CJEU reviewed the 
consistency of the dawn raids conducted by the European Commission in the context of the enforcement 
of EU competition rules not only on the basis of the Charter, but also the ECHR and the case law of the 
ECtHR. The CJEU, interestingly enough, did not sketch the earlier discussed legal context for this 
reliance through, for instance, referring to Article 52(3) of the Charter. What is even more remarkable 
is that the CJEU even took the EC(t)HR as the starting point, since it first examined the compatibility 
of the CJEU’s judicial review of Commission inspection decisions with Articles 8 and Article 6(1) 
ECHR before reaching the conclusion that there was no violation of Articles 7 and 47 of the Charter.57 
Another case which runs counter to the earlier mentioned Charter-centrism is Evonik Degussa. The 
General Court primarily applied Article 8(1) ECHR instead of Article 7 of the Charter and found that 
the right to protection of privacy does not extend to reputational damage stemming from a person’s own 
(criminal) conduct.58 In appeal, the CJEU also relied on the ECtHR even though it did not cite specific 
judgments.59 Another noteworthy judgment that extensively discussed the ECHR as well as the case law 
of the ECtHR is Tall in which the CJEU held that suspensory effect is not required for appeals against 
decisions not to further examine an asylum application when they do not lead to the removal of the 
person concerned.60 As a matter of fact, the CJEU went much further in this respect than AG who only 
mentioned the observation of the European Commission on the basis of the ECtHR that expulsion 
decisions must, in principle, have suspensory effects.61 In another EAW case, Lanigan, the CJEU also 
applied the case law of the ECtHR on Article 5(1)(f) ECHR on extradition procedures in the context of 
surrender procedures and held that detention of the requested person is not justified when that procedure 
is not carried out with due diligence. The CJEU subsequently enumerated several factors reminiscent of 
the ECtHR case law which national courts should take into account while conducting the latter review.62 
 
2.2. (Passing) references to the ECtHR 
In other cases, the CJEU has made shorter references to the case law of the ECtHR. The rest of this 
section will distinguish between four different types of references, albeit these are by no means 
(mutually) exhaustive: references in sensitive cases, citations when an EU law measure or Charter 
provision is interpreted for the first time, seemingly superfluous references and selective shopping in 
the case law of the ECtHR.  
                                                 
57 Case C-583/13 P, Deutsche Bahn and others v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2015:404, paras. 32-36 and 46-48. M VEENBRINK 
and J KROMMENDIJK, case note on Case C-583/13 P, Deutsche Bahn, European Human Rights Cases 2015/187. 
58 Case T-341/12, Evonik Degussa, ECLI:EU:T:2015:51, paras. 123-126. 
59 Case C-162/15 P-R, Evonik Degussa, ECLI:EU:C:2016:142, para. 43. 
60 Case C-239/14, Tall, ECLI:EU:C:2015:824. Compare this judgment with Case C-562/13, Abdida, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453. 
61 AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-239/14, Tall, ECLI:EU:C:2015:531, para. 34. 
62 C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, ECLI:EU:C:2015:474, paras. 59-60; Gallardo Sanchez v. Italy, no. 11620/07, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:2015:0324JUD001162007, paras. 41-50. 
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It is not surprising that references are especially made in sensitive or complex cases, where a 
reference to another supranational court could strengthen the arguments and conclusions of the CJEU.63 
The best illustration of a post-Opinion 2/13 case in a sensitive area is Taricco. In this Grand Chamber 
judgment the CJEU, in line with AG Kokott, expanded the obligation for Member States to prosecute 
VAT fraud more effectively by setting aside an Italian rule which provided for strict limitation periods. 
In this case the CJEU referred to several judgments of the ECtHR in response to the observations of 
several interested parties that this might create tension with Article 49 of the Charter and the principle 
of legality. Relying on Strasbourg, the CJEU supported its conclusion that the disapplication of national 
law does not breach the rights of the accused.64 It does not seem unreasonable to infer that the CJEU 
aimed to divert some of the anticipated criticism with its reliance on another court. This criticism was 
indeed voiced afterwards. Taricco has been criticised for lowering the level of fundamental rights 
protection of suspects and easily disregarding the legal traditions of Member States which attach more 
importance to the principle of legality and offer more protection against retroactive changes of limitation 
periods.65 The heavy critique eventually spurred the Italian Constitutional Court to send another 
reference in which the CJEU was essentially asked to reconsider its judgment.66 Without touching upon 
the question whether this criticism is justified, the reliance on the ECtHR shows that Strasbourg could 
be useful in such a sensitive area as national criminal (procedural) law.67 Other cases where a reference 
to the ECtHR was especially useful are Neptune Distribution and CHEZ. In Neptune Distribution (and 
later Philip Morris), the CJEU held that commercial information is in principle covered by the freedom 
of expression in Article 11 of the Charter.68 The CJEU in essence recognized a corporate human rights 
to freedom of expression, a notion which is controversial and has been criticized.69 In addition, another 
                                                 
63 The landmark judgments in Kadi I and N.S. are good examples of this. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi I, 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:461; Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S., ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. S IGLESIAS SANCHEZ, above n xx, 
1604; K LENAERTS, ‘Interlocking Legal orders in the European Union and comparative law’ (2003) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 873, 875. 
64 Case C-105/14, Taricco, ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, para. 57. The CJEU also relied on the case law of the ECtHR in relation to 
the principle of legality in Case C-72/15, Rosneft, ECLI:EU:C:2017:236, paras. 164-166. 
65 E.g. M LASSALLE, ‘Taricco kills two birds with one stone for the sake of the PIF’, 27 October 2015, European Law Blog; D 
SARMIENTO, ‘The scope of application of EU law and national criminal law: some thoughts on Taricco’, 8 September 2015, 
<despiteourdifferencesblog.wordpress.com>; E BILLIS, ‘The European Court of Justice: a “quasi-constitutional court” in 
criminal matters?’ (2016) New Journal of European Criminal Law 20.Timmerman, however, argued that the CJEU provided 
an interpretation in conformity with the ECtHR, but which is merely providing the minimum standard of protection and which 
thus consciously chose not to go beyond the level of protection under the ECHR. M TIMMERMAN, ‘Balancing effective criminal 
sanctions with effective fundamental rights protection in cases of VAT fraud: Taricco’ (2016) 3 Common Market Law Review 
779. 
66 L S Rossi, ‘How Could the ECJ Escape from the Taricco Quagmire?’, 21 April 2017, Verfassungsblog. 
67 Billis, who is of the opinion that Taricco is not in line with the ECtHR case law, noted that the quoted judgement of the 
ECtHR paradoxically underscores strict limitation periods and rejects unforeseeable rules E BILLIS, above n xx, 34. 
68 Nonetheless, the CJEU eventually considered the French measure which obliged Neptune Distribution to remove misleading 
claims about low levels of sodium in natural mineral water from packages to be justified and proportional. C-157/14, Neptune 
Distribution, ECLI:EU:C:2015:823, para. 64. In Philip Morris, the CJEU even referred to the case law of the ECtHR without 
citing a particular judgment. Case C-547/14, Philip Morris, ECLI:EU:C:2016:325, para. 147. 
69 E.g. recently A SANCHEZ-GRAELLS and F Marcos, ‘Human rights’ protection for corporate antitrust defendants: Are we not 
going overboard?, in: P NIHOUL and T SKOCZNY (eds), Procedural fairness in competition proceedings, Edward Elgar 2015, 
pp 84-107; T ISIKSEL, ‘The rights of man and the rights of the man-made: Corporations and human rights’ (2016) 2 Human 
Rights Quarterly 294. 
11 
 
sensitive matter where the ECtHR has a lot of experience is the discrimination facing Roma.70 In CHEZ, 
the CJEU thus referred to two judgments in relation to the concept of ethnicity and its application to the 
Roma community.71 
Covaci is the best example of a judgment in which the CJEU relied on Strasbourg when it 
interpreted an EU law measure or Charter provision for the first time. In the first judgment about the 
Roadmap Directives on procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings the CJEU made a short reference 
to an ECtHR judgment about the absence of a necessity to provide a written translation of all items of 
written evidence or official documents.72 It is, however, unclear why the CJEU made a reference to such 
an old Strasbourg precedent and did not rely on more recent Grand Chamber judgments of the ECtHR 
on this matter.73 
In other cases the CJEU referred to Strasbourg, but it was not always clear why this reference 
was needed, at least if one is convinced of the argument that the CJEU applies a Charter-centred 
approach. An example is Neptune Distribution, where the CJEU relied on the ECtHR (a second time) 
to support its finding that correct information about the contents of products for consumers is closely 
related to the protection of human health and which is thus a question of general interest.74 This support 
from Strasbourg seems superfluous because of the ample case law of the CJEU in which it came to 
similar conclusion.75 Nor was the CJEU doing very much with this reference in its review of the French 
interference in Neptune Distribution. Likewise, the CJEU referred to the ECtHR in Nikolajeva in support 
of its consideration that an application for registration of a trade mark constitutes a substantive interest 
protected under the fundamental right to property, while it could have easily based itself on its own case 
law.76 
One example of selective shopping in the case law of the ECtHR is the politically controversial 
headscarves case of Achbita.77 In this judgment, the CJEU favoured the employer’s wish to project an 
image of neutrality towards customers as part of an employer’s freedom to conduct a business as laid 
down in Article 16 of the Charter over an individual’s right to freedom of religion.78 The CJEU justified 
the following conclusion with a selective reference to the judgment of the ECtHR in Eweida: ‘An 
interpretation to the effect that the pursuit of that aim allows, within certain limits, a restriction to be 
                                                 
70 AG Kokott in Case C-394/11, Belov, ECLI:EU:C:2012:585, para. 3. 
71 Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie Bulgaria, ECLI:EU:C:2015:480, para. 46.   
72 Case C-216/14, Covaci, ECLI:EU:C:2015:686, para. 39; ECtHR, Kamasinski v. Austria, no. 9783/82, 
ECLI:CE:ECHR:1989:1219JUD000978382. 
73 Hermi v. Italy, no. 18114/02, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2006:1018JUD001811402. 
74 Case C-157/14, Neptune Distribution, ECLI:EU:C:2015:823, para. 74.   
75 E.g. Case C-544/10, Deutsches Weintor, ECLI:EU:C:2012:526, paras. 50-52. This judgment was referred to four times by 
the CJEU. 
76 Case C-280/15, Nikolajeva, ECLI:EU:C:2016:467, para. 43; Case C-580/13, Coty Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2015:485. By 
contrast, the CJEU recognized for the first time, at least to the author’s knowledge, that the rights resulting from payment to 
contributions to a social security scheme constitute property rights with reference to three judgments of the ECtHR. Case C-
258/14, Florescu, ECLI:EU:C:2017:448, para. 50. 
77 See more in depth S OUALD-CHAIB and V DAVID, ‘European Court of Justice keeps the door to religious discrimination in 
the private workplace opened. The European Court of Human Rights could close it’, 27 March 2017, Strasbourg Observers 
Blog. 
78 G DAVIES, ‘Achbita v G4S: Religious equality squeezed between profit and prejudice’, 6 April 2017, European Law Blog. 
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imposed on the freedom of religion is moreover, borne out by the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights in relation to Article 9 of the ECHR.’79 The CJEU, however, failed to pay any attention 
to the fair balance test required by the ECtHR and the fact that the ECtHR was actually very strict in 
accepting interferences with the freedom of religion in Eweida. The judgment of the CJEU does not 
seem to fit well with the conclusion of the ECtHR, in the same paragraph as quoted in Achbita, in relation 
to the British employer’s neutrality policy that ‘while this aim was undoubtedly legitimate, the domestic 
courts accorded it too much weight’.80 
 
2.3. The ECtHR as afterthought 
In a third category of cases, the ECtHR is not part of the considerations which led to the conclusion of 
the CJEU, but is only mentioned at the end of the judgment as some sort of afterthought or cross-check 
to support the CJEU’s own conclusions. This means that the ‘Strasbourg-proofness’ of the CJEU’s 
analysis is mentioned at the end as a ‘by the way’ note.81 These judgments also underline the CJEU’s 
wish to firstly develop its own autonomous (Charter) interpretation instead of simply relying on another 
court. The best illustration is J.N. which deals with detention of asylum seekers in the context of their 
deportation for reasons of public order and security. The CJEU went to great lengths to examine whether 
detention is valid in the light of Article 6 of the Charter laying down the right to liberty following a 
careful and detailed proportionality assessment in the context of Article 52(1) of the Charter.82 The 
CJEU, however, had to somehow reflect upon the case law of Strasbourg, because the referring Dutch 
court had explicitly asked about the validity of the Reception Conditions Directive in the light of one 
specific judgment of the ECtHR. The CJEU did so, but only at the end as a clear afterthought: ‘Finally, 
it must be recalled that...’.83 The approach of the CJEU can be contrasted with the Opinion of AG 
Sharpston who analysed Article 5 ECHR and Article 6 of the Charter in a more combined fashion and 
did not solely restrict herself to an analysis of Article 5(1)(f) ECHR, but also considered the other 
exemptions under Article 5(1) ECHR.84 
This marginal cross-check relates to another practice whereby the CJEU cites the ECtHR in order 
to argue why a certain EU practice is not contrary to the ECHR.85 The CJEU, for example, held in the 
                                                 
79 Case C-157/15, Achbita, ECLI:EU:C:2017:203, para. 39; Eweida and Others v. United Kingdom, nos. 48420/10, 36516/10, 
51671/10 and 59842/10, CE:ECHR:2013:0115JUD004842010, para. 94. 
80 Ibid, para. 94. 
81 Case C-217/15, Orsi, ECLI:EU:C:2017:264, paras. 24-25; Case C-294/16 PPU, JZ, ECLI:EU:C:2016:610, para. 48; Case 
C-105/14, Taricco, ECLI:EU:C:2015:555, para.. 57; AG Wathelet in Joined Cases C-401/15 to C-403/15, Depesme, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:430, para. 58. Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 832.  
82 Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N., ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, paras. 50-76.  
83 Ibid., para. 77. 
84 AG Sharpston in Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N., ECLI:EU:C:2016:85, paras. 58, 60 and 117-215. This difference is also clear 
from a more quantitative point. AG Sharpston refers to 54 times to the ECHR (32 times to ECtHR) and 57 times to the Charter, 
while the CJEU judgments contains 21 references to the 21, 3 references to the ECtHR and 39 to the Charter. Note that doubts 
have been expressed as to the alleged lower level of protection offered by the CJEU. M RHIMES, ‘Freedom, Asylum Seekers, 
and Two Lots of European Human Rights’, 17 February 2016, UK human rights blog. 
85 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 830. In Bonda, the CJEU also held the administrative nature of the 
measures provided for in the relevant Regulation ‘is not called into question by an examination of the case-law of the European 
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context of EU competition law that the case law of the ECtHR with respect to Article 6 ECHR, more in 
particular the Menarini judgment, does not preclude a ‘penalty’ from being imposed by an 
administrative authority (the Commission) in the first instance when such a penalty can be reviewed by 
a judicial body (the CJEU) that has full jurisdiction and can quash the decision of the authority.86 The 
extensive reference to Strasbourg in Deutsche Bahn also falls into this category. The CJEU went to great 
lengths to argue that the system of dawn raid complies with fundamental rights.87 It held that Article 6 
ECHR is not infringed by the ex post legal and factual review by the CJEU of inspection decisions which 
could lead to its annulment as a result of which the Commission is unable to use the gathered 
information. 
 
2.4. No references to the ECtHR 
There are several judgments in which the CJEU omits any reference to Strasbourg even though this 
would have been possible and perhaps even appropriate. This section, firstly, discusses judgments in 
which an absence of Strasbourg is understandable. Secondly, judgments in which a reference was 
possible.88 Thirdly, judgments where a reference would seem appropriate. 
Firstly, in some judgments, the lack of references is understandable.89 For example, in Léger the 
CJEU held that the permanent deferral from blood donation for men who have had sexual relations with 
other men may be justified only when there are no effective and less onerous alternatives in the form of 
detection techniques that also ensure a high level of health protection for blood recipients. There is no 
Strasbourg precedent on the specific point of blood bans, but even more generally it could be argued 
that there is not inspiration to derive from the ECtHR case law, since the ECtHR is generally considered 
to lag behind the CJEU in terms of protecting LGBT rights.90 Another example is Genc about the 
application of the standstill clause in the EU-Turkey Association Agreement.91 This case dealt with a 
Danish measure which made family reunification between a lawfully residing Turkish worker and his 
minor child subject to the condition that the latter has (the possibility of establishing) sufficient ties with 
Denmark to enable him successfully to integrate. The referring court explicitly referred to the case law 
of the ECtHR with respect to the right to family life in relation to the proportionality assessment. Both 
the CJEU and the AG did not refer to fundamental rights or the Charter, because the standstill clause 
offered higher protection than the ECHR.  
                                                 
Court of Human Rights on the concept of “criminal proceedings” within the meaning of Article 4(1) of Protocol No 7’. Case 
C-489/10, Bonda, ECLI:EU:C:2012:319, para. 36. 
86 Menarini Diagnostics v. Italy, no. 43509/08, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2011:0927JUD004350908; Case C-501/11 P, Schindler, 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:522, para. 35-39; Case C-510/11 P, Kone, ECLI:EU:C:2013:696, para. 22.  
87 A STEENE, ‘Nexans, Deutsche Bahn, and the CJEU’s refusal to follow ECHR case law on dawn raids’ (2016) Journal of 
European competition law & practice 1, 14. 
88 For this argument in relation to the right to property, see P OLIVER AND C STOTHERS, ‘Intellectual property under the Charter: 
are the Court’s scales properly calibrated’ (2017) Common Market Law Review 517, 541. 
89 E.g. when the CJEU could not deal with the merits of the case in appeal. Case C-176/13, Council v. Bank Mellat, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:96, paras. 51-52; Case C-200/13, Council v. Bank Saderat Iran, ECLI:EU:C:2016:284, para. 49. 
90 P DUNNE, ‘A right to donate blood? Permanent deferrals for “Men who have Sex with Men” (MSM): Léger’ (2015) Common 
Market Law Review 1661, 1676. 
91 C-561/14, Genc, ECLI:EU:C:2016:247. 
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Secondly, without suggesting that the CJEU should have referred to the ECtHR, a potential for 
invoking Strasbourg exists when the referring court explicitly referred to the case law of the ECtHR or 
when the AG makes references to the ECtHR.92 The latter happened, for example, in relation to the 
sanctioning powers of the Commission in the context of competition law (InnoLux), the right to avoid 
self-incrimination (HeidelbergCement), the use of presumptions (Anbouba), the right to appeal (Imtech), 
the Brussel II bis Regulation and child abduction (Bradbrooke), the revocation of residence permit 
(H.T.), conscientious objection to military service (Shepherd), the disqualification of judges when they 
expressed provisional opinions (Ogynyanov), the right to a remedy against a decision to transfer of an 
asylum seeker (Ghezelbash), pre-surrender detention (Vilkas) and the freedom of religion 
(Bougnaoui).93 It is not always clear why the CJEU found it unnecessary to explicitly cite an ECtHR 
judgment in these (and other) cases. It could be that the CJEU simply agrees with the AG, but does not 
find it necessary to repeat the AG’s analysis and citations of ECtHR.94  Or it could be that the CJEU 
disagrees with the AG. 
It is worthwhile to discuss a judgment where a reference to the ECtHR would have been 
possible, but not necessary indispensable. In Schrems, the CJEU declared the Commission’s US Safe 
Harbour decision, determining that the US offers an adequate level of protection of the personal data 
transferred, invalid in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter, dealing with respect for private 
and family life, the protection of personal data and the right to effective judicial protection.95 Schrems 
can be contrasted with WebMindLicenses in which the CJEU made rather extensive references to the 
ECtHR (see section 2.1). Schrems only referred to the CJEU’s own precedents, including the seminal 
case of Digital Rights, where the CJEU declared the Data Retention Directive to be invalid in the light 
of Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter.96 It was in this latter case that the CJEU still extensively referred to 
the ECtHR ‘by analogy’.97 The absence of a reference to Strasbourg in Schrems might, firstly, reflect an 
idea among CJEU judges that it is not necessary to constantly refer back to Strasbourg precedents, or in 
the words of two interviewees to ‘Adam and Eve’ or ‘Noah’s Ark’.98 It is generally considered sufficient 
to rely on the CJEU’s own precedent in which the case law of the ECtHR was considered and quoted 
                                                 
92 See the reference of the Dutch court in Case C-453/16 PPU, Özçelik, ECLI:EU:C:2016:783 available at 
<www.minbuza.nl/binaries/content/assets/ecer/ecer/import/hof_van_justitie/nieuwe_hofzaken_inclusief_verwijzingsuitspraa
k/2016/c-zakennummers/c-453-16-ppu-verwijzingsbs-rb-ams_redacted.pdf>; Case C-108/16 PPU, Dworzecki, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:346, para. 16; See also C-685/15, Online Games and others, ECLI:EU:C:2017:452, para. 40. 
93 AG Wathelet in Case C-231/14 P, InnoLux, ECLI:EU:C:2015:292, para. 66; AG Wahl in Case C-247/14 P, 
HeidelbergCement AG, ECLI:EU:C:2015:694, para. 153; AG Bot in Cases C-605/13 P and C-630/13 P, Anbouba, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:1, paras. 51-55; AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-300/14, Imtech, ECLI:EU:C:2015:557, para. 42; AG Jääskinen 
in Case C-498/14 PPU, Bradbrooke, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2484, paras. 42 and 65; AG Sharpston in Case C-373/13, H. T., 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2218, paras. 60 and 96; AG Sharpston in Case C-472/13, Shepherd, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2360, para. 51; AG 
Bot in Case C-614/14, Ognyanov, ECLI:EU:C:2016:111, paras. 75-91; AG Sharpston in Case C-63/13, Ghezelbash, 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:186, paras. 80-83; AG Bobek in Case C-640/15, Vilkas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:826, paras. 48-52 and 73; AG 
Sharpston in Case C-188/15, Bougnaoui, ECLI:EU:C:2016:553. 
94 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 827; K LENAERTS, above n xx, 875. 
95 C-362/14, Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:627. 
96 AG Bot only referred to the ECtHR when he described the main conclusions of the CJEU in Digital Rights. Case C-362/14, 
Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:627, para. 193. 
97 Joined Cases C-293/12 and 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland, ECLI:EU:C:2014:238, para. 47, 54 and 55. 
98 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 829-830.  
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for the first time. This, for instance, happened in Åkerberg Fransson, where the CJEU referred back to 
Bonda in which the ECtHR’s Engel-criteria determining whether a prosecution is criminal in nature 
played an important role.99 Schrems could also be an illustration of such a natural ‘dilution’ of the ECtHR 
case law.100 The absence of any engagement with the case law of the ECtHR might, secondly, stem from 
the idea that the CJEU expressed in Tele 2 as well that it is not necessary to examine this case law also 
because Article 8 of the Charter has no equivalent in the ECHR.101 It could also reflects an ever more 
confident stance of the CJEU, especially in areas dealing with fundamental rights where EU law is going 
ahead of ECHR developments, including data protection.102  
The judgment which has maybe led to the most criticism given a failure to engage with the case 
law of the ECtHR is Delvigne. In this case, the Grand Chamber dealt with a reference for a preliminary 
ruling about French legislation which deprives persons convicted for serious crimes of their civic rights, 
including their right to vote. The omission of the ECHR and ECtHR is especially remarkable because 
AG Cruz Villalón held that this case ‘brings to mind immediately the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights’, which he extensively discussed.103 In addition, in earlier judgments of the CJEU about 
voting for the elections of the European Parliament did engage with the case law of the ECtHR.104 
Pertinent ECtHR judgments include Hirst and Scoppola where the ECtHR determined that a general, 
automatic and indiscriminate disenfranchisement of convicted prisoners breaches Article 3 of Protocol 
1.105 Even though Article 39 of the Charter is not mentioned as a Charter provision that corresponds to 
an ECHR provision, it would have seemed appropriate for the CJEU to explicitly relate to this case law, 
particularly in the context of the proportionality assessment.106 This is especially true since the CJEU 
held that the French measure is proportionate ‘in so far as it takes into account the nature and gravity of 
the criminal offence committed and the duration of the penalty’.107 This conclusion is noteworthy in the 
light of the insufficient sketch of the factual and legal French context by the referring court. AG Cruz 
Villalón even noted that ‘there have been few occasions where the Court has been seised of a reference 
                                                 
99 In Bonda, the Court of Justice adopted a material test in line with the ECtHR’s Engel case law. Case C-617/10, Åkerberg 
Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, para. 35; Case C-489/10 Bonda, ECLI:EU:C:2012:319, para. 37; Engel v. Netherlands, no. 
5100/71, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1976:1123JUD000510071.  
100 X GROUSSOT, J HETTNE and G T PETURSSON, above n xx.  
101 Case C-203/15 Tele2 Sverige AB, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, para. 129; This idea has been criticised on the grounds that there 
is equivalent case law of the ECtHR corresponding to Article 8. M WHITE, ‘The new Opinion on Data Retention: Does it protect 
the right to privacy’, 27 July 2016, EU Law Analysis.  
102 T OJANEN, ‘Making the essence of fundamental rights real: The Court of Justice of the European Union clarifies the structure 
of fundamental rights under the Charter. Case note on ECJ 6 October 2015, Case C-362/14, Maximilillian Schrems v Data 
Protection Commissioner’ (2016) 2 European Constitutional Law Review 318, 329.  
103 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in C-650/13, Delvigne, ECLI:EU:C:2015:363, para. 109. 
104 E.g. Case C-300/04, Eman and Sevinger, ECLI:EU:C:2006:545, paras. 36 and 54; Case C-145/04, Spain v. United Kingdom, 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:543, paras. 94 and 96. 
105 Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2), no. 74025/01, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2005:1006JUD007402501, para. 82; Scoppola v. Italy, no. 
126/05, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2012:0522JUD000012605. 
106 H VAN EIJKEN and J W VAN ROSSUM, ‘Prisoner disenfranchisement and the right to vote in election to the European 
Parliament: Universal suffrage key to unlocking political citzenship?’ (2016) European Constitutional Law 114, 128; J SHAW, 
‘Prisoner voting: now a matter of EU law’, 15 October 2015, EU Law Analysis. 
107 C-650/13, Delvigne, ECLI:EU:C:2015:648, para. 49. Contrast with AG Cruz Villalón who explicitly left the proportionality 
analysis for the national court. Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in C-650/13, Delvigne, ECLI:EU:C:2015:363, paras. 123-124. 
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for a preliminary ruling in which there is such a dearth of argument’.108 Several observers also observed 
that this rather lenient analysis, giving considerable leeway to the national legislature, might not have 
been accepted by the ECtHR because the latter conducts a more thorough proportionality assessment.109 
Nonetheless, at the same time it seems not unthinkable that the CJEU was inspired by Strasbourg and 
the ECtHR thus had an implicit influence, since the CJEU does not explicitly refer to everything 
considered.110 Firstly, the CJEU for the first time recognised in line with the ECtHR that the Charter 
provision constitutes a right of Union citizens. This is not so evident, because at first sight Article 39(2) 
of the Charter does not seem to include an individual rights but merely lays down an obligation for 
states.111 Secondly, the CJEU’s focus on the non-blanket nature of the deprivation also echoes the case 
law of the ECtHR.112 
 
2.5. No references to (the Charter of) fundamental rights  
There are also several cases in which the CJEU not only omits a reference to the EC(t)HR, but also does 
not engage with the Charter of fundamental rights. Even though this fifth category does not strictly 
speaking relate to the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR, it is relevant to consider. This is 
because this category reflects a reluctance to approach and solve cases from the perspective of 
fundamental rights because of the strong consciousness among CJEU judges that the Court is not a 
fundamental rights court.113 CJEU judges consistently emphasise in lectures that: ‘the Court of Justice 
is not a human rights court; it is the Supreme Court of the European Union’.114 Cases are preferably 
solved on the basis of secondary legislation, especially when that legislation contains a certain balance 
between clashing fundamental rights.115 
In several judgments the CJEU dodged the fundamental rights related questions on procedural 
grounds and in doing so failed to engage to deal with the Charter on substantive grounds.116 One example 
is Willems which dealt with the storage and use of biometric data. The CJEU held that this falls outside 
                                                 
108 Opinion of AG Cruz Villalón in C-650/13, Delvigne, ECLI:EU:C:2015:363, para. 51. 
109 H VAN EIJKEN and J W VAN ROSSUM, above n xx, 129-130; S COUTTS, ‘Case C-650/13 Delvigne – A political citizenship?’, 
21 October 2015, European law blog 
110 J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 817. CJEU Judge Lenaerts, for example held that the CJEU’s research of ECtHR case law has 
often backed up a judgment of the CJEU but ‘rarely transpires directly in the reasoning’. K LENAERTS, above n xx, 873-875; G 
DE BÚRCA, above n xx, 178. 
111 C-650/13, Delvigne, ECLI:EU:C:2015:648, para. 44; The ECtHR recognised this for the first time in Mathieu-Mohin and 
Clerfayt v. Belgium, no. 9267/81, ECLI:CE:ECHR:1987:0302JUD000926781. S Platon, ‘The Delvigne judgment of the CJEU: 
going voldly... but perhaps not boldly enough’, 24 October 2015, Verfassungsblog.  
112 H VAN EIJKEN and J W VAN ROSSUM, above n xx, 130; S COUTTS, above n xx.  
113 The CJEU, for example, does not deal with the right to housing in relation to deficient Spanish mortgage law in several 
judgments, including Gutiérrez Naranjo, Aziz and Sánchez Morcillo. J C BENITO SÁNCHEZ, ‘The CJEU and Spanish mortgage 
law: consumer protection, floor clauses and accelerated repayment’, 20 February 2017, EU Law Analysis. Another example 
given during the interviews is Case C-394/12, Abdullahi, ECLI:EU:C:2013:813; Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, 
above n xx, 827. 
114 President Skouris during a lecture in May 2014 as quoted in L BESSELINK, ‘The CJEU as the European ‘Supreme Court’: 
Setting Aside Citizens’ Rights for EU Law Supremacy’, 18 August 2014, Verfassungsblog.  
115 E.g. Joined Cases C-680/15 and C-681/15, Asklepios Kliniken, ECLI:EU:C:2017:317, para. 27; Case C-13/16, Rīgas 
satiksme, ECLI:EU:C:2017:336. Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 827; see also in relation to intellectual 
propert rights, P OLIVER AND C STOTHERS, above n xx, 541. 
116 For a pre-Opinion 2/13 case, see Dano, case C-333/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, paras. 89-90.  
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the scope of Regulation No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports 
and travel documents which means that the Charter is not applicable. The CJEU concluded this despite 
the fact that the referring Dutch court had explicitly stated in its referral that the Charter applied because 
Privacy Directive 95/46 was applicable. The CJEU did not engage with this argument and the Privacy 
Directive on the (rather questionable) grounds that ‘by its questions, the referring court requests the 
interpretation of Regulation No 2252/2004 and only that regulation’.117 A similar tactic was applied by 
the CJEU in X and X about humanitarian visa and the EU Regulation establishing the Visa Code. Even 
though the request for such visas were ‘formally submitted’ on the basis of the Visa Code and the 
Belgian authorities had handled the requests fully in line with the Code, the CJEU considered 
nonetheless that the matter fell outside the scope of the Visa Code and the Charter.118 The CJEU justified 
this on the basis that the intention of the persons submitting applications for visas on humanitarian 
grounds was to apply for asylum, immediately upon their arrival in Belgium and thus ‘the purpose of 
the application differs from that of a short-term visa’.119 The reliance on intentions rather than formal 
connections has been criticised.120  
Several other post-Opinion 2/13 judgments illustrate the tendency to downplay fundamental 
rights as well. One interesting area where this is visible are cases dealing with the right to an effective 
remedy and the principle of effective judicial protection.121 In such cases, the CJEU has also, albeit not 
consistently122, refrained from referring to or analysing the issue in the light of Article 47 of the Charter 
and Article 6 ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR.123 In Orizzonte, the CJEU, for example, ruled on 
an Italian court fees scheme which provides for fees which are higher in procurement cases than in 
ordinary administrative cases.124 In addition, this system also enables courts to raise new (cumulative) 
fees for supplementary pleas which broaden the dispute. The CJEU examined this scheme in the context 
of the procedural autonomy of Member States and the limitations under the principle of effectiveness 
and equivalence. By contrast, AG Jääskinen approached the matter from the point of view Article 47 of 
the Charter and also discussed a pertinent judgment of the ECtHR in relation to court fees as an obstacle 
                                                 
117 Case C-446/12, Willems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:238, para. 52. 
118 AG Mengozzi in Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X, ECLI:EU:C:2017:93, paras. 32-33 and 47. 
119 C-638/16 PPU, X and X, ECLI:EU:C:2017:173, para. 47. 
120 For a more extensive discussion of this (in Dutch), see J KROMMENDIJK, case note on C-638/16 PPU, X and X, European 
Human Rights Cases 2017/81; M OVÁDEK, ‘The CJEU on humanitarian via: discovering ‘un-chartered’ waters of EU law’, 13 
March 2017, Verfassungsblog. 
121 Case C-63/15, Ghezelbash, ECLI:EU:C:2016:409; Case C-155/15, Karim, ECLI:EU:C:2016:410. M den Heijer, ‘Remedies 
in the Dublin Regulation: Ghezelbash and Karim’ (2017) Common Market Law Review 859, 866.  
122 See recently Case C-205/15, Toma, ECLI:EU:C:2016:499, paras. 41-44 and 55-56. J KROMMENDIJK, case note on Case C-
205/15, Toma, European Human Rights Cases 2016/203. 
123 Safjan counted that only 16 out of the approximately 60 post-Lisbon cases dealing with effective judicial protection referred 
to Strasbourg case law, something which Prechal qualified as understandable because Article 47 of the Charter is a self-standing 
principle. M SAFJAN, ‘A Union of effective judicial protection. Addressing a multi-level challenge through the lens of Article 
47 CFREU’, King’s College London, <www.kcl.ac.uk/law/research/centres/european/Speech-KINGS-COLLEGE.pdf>, p. 9. 
124 Case C-61/14, Orizzonte Salute, ECLI:EU:C:2015:655. J KROMMENDIJK, ‘Is there light on the horizon? The distinction 
between ‘Rewe-effectiveness’ and the principle of effective judicial protection in Article 47 of the Charter after Orizzonte’ 
(2016) Common Market Law Review 1395. 
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to the right of access to a court.125 Something similar happened in Târșia. This case dealt with the 
impossibility for Romanian courts to revise a final decision of a court in civil proceedings when that 
decision is subsequently found to be incompatible with an interpretation of EU law, while that possibility 
exists in relation to administrative proceedings. The Grand Chamber again approached the matter from 
the angle of procedural autonomy excluding any discussion of the EC(t)HR and Charter while only 
referring in more general terms to the rights of the defence and the principle of legal certainty.126 The 
latter is especially remarkable in this case where the referring court explicitly asked about the conformity 
of the Romanian rule with several Charter provisions, including Article 47. AG Jääskinen, nonetheless, 
discussed rather extensively the case law of the ECtHR.127 Likewise, in Chmieleski, AG Wathelet 
discussed three judgments of the ECtHR on the proportionality of sanctions extensively, while the CJEU 
remained silent on these and did not even refer to the Article 49(3) of the Charter.128 
The limited scrutiny of fundamental rights is also visible in family reunification immigration 
cases.129  One example is P and S. In this judgment, the CJEU was critical of the relatively high amount 
of Dutch fines for third-country nationals who are long-term residents and who fail the civic integration 
examination. The CJEU held that such high fines are liable to jeopardise the achievement of the 
objectives pursued by Directive 2003/109 without reflecting on the case law of the ECtHR with respect 
to the proportionality of penalties as the AG did.130  Another example is K and A dealing with the 
requirement for third country nationals to pass a civic integration assessment.131  
 
3. Concluding remarks: Opinion 2/13 as a game changer? 
It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to reflect on the diverse approach of the CJEU from a more 
normative point of view. Suffice to say that an alleingang is not wholly inappropriate when the EU law 
provides a higher level of fundamental rights protection than the ECHR or the case law of the ECtHR, 
as in Delvigne and Genc.132 What is, however, most problematic is the diverse and conflicting approach, 
especially for national courts who struggle to reconcile EU law with the ECHR and the case law of the 
                                                 
125 Stankov v. Bulgaria, no. 68490/01, ECLI:CE:ECHR:2007:0712JUD006849001para 52. AG Jääskinen in Case C-61/14, 
Orizzonte Salute, ECLI:EU:C:2015:307, para. 38. 
126 Case C-69/14, Târșia, ECLI:EU:C:2015:662, para. 38. 
127 AG Jääskinen in Case C-69/14, Târșia, ECLI:EU:C:2015:396, paras. 40-43. 
128 Case C-255/14, Chmielewski, ECLI:EU:C:2015:475; AG Wathelet in Case C-255/14, Chmielewski, ECLI:EU:C:2015:308, 
paras. 36-64. Other cases in which the CJEU only relies on general principles of EU law instead of the Charter include Case 
59/11, Kokopelli, ECLI:EU:C:2012:447; Case C-206/13, Siragusa, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, para. 34; Joined Cases C-29/13 and 
C-30/13, Global Trans Lodzhistik, ECLI:EU:C:2014:140, para 51. X GROUSSOT, J HETTNE and G T PETURSSON, above n xx. 
129 Contrast the more recent judgments with older judgments couched in terms of fundamental rights, such as Case C-109/01, 
Akrich, ECLI:EU:C:2003:491, para. 60; Case C-60/00, Carpenter, ECLI:EU:C:2002:434, para. 42. M DE SOMER and M P 
VINK, ‘Precedent’ and fundamental rights in the CJEU’s case law on family reunification immigration’, in: C NEUHOLD and S 
VANHOONACKER (eds): ‘Dynamics of institutional cooperation in the European Union: Dimensions and effects’ (2015) 
European Integration online Papers 1. 
130 C-579/13, P and S, ECLI:EU:C:2015:39, para. 104. 
131 AG Kokott did refer, albeit in a footnote, to the case law of the ECtHR in order to support the interpretation that married 
couples do not have an unconditional right to residence in a particular state. Case C-153/14, K and A, ECLI:EU:C:2015:186, 
para. 31. 
132 See also Case C-528/15, Al Chodor, ECLI:EU:C:2017:213. 
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ECtHR, as is also illustrated by the request for a preliminary ruling by the Dutch court in J.N..133 The 
typology in the previous section illustrates the diversity in the way in which the CJEU has dealt with the 
case law of the ECtHR. There is especially a discrepancy between, on the one hand, the more 
“Strasbourg-friendly” judgments of Aranyosi, C.K. and WebMindLicenses and, on the other hand, J.N., 
Achbita and Delvigne. These differences are nothing new and reflect earlier observations of academics 
and CJEU judges and référendaires that there is no uniform practice or methodology with respect to the 
case law of the ECtHR.134 It is not always clear how the differences in the approach of the CJEU could 
be explained and what the reasons behind a (non) citation are.  It is not the purpose of this chapter to 
explain those differences. It is sufficient to say that some of these differences can be attributed to the 
composition of a Chamber and the involved judges and référendaires with different writing styles, legal 
background and areas of expertise.135 In addition, the CJEU is also more compelled to refer to the ECtHR 
when the (intervening) parties relied on it or when the national court explicitly asked about it.136 This is, 
however, not necessarily always the case.137  
The previous sections beg the question as to whether there has been a change in the way in 
which the CJEU has dealt with the case law of the ECtHR since Opinion 2/13. Section 1 showed that 
the CJEU has become more reluctant from a formal point of view to attach legal value to the ECtHR 
since Opinion 2/13. This, has, however not necessarily resulted in a neglect of Strasbourg case law as 
section 2 illustrated. Nor has it led to CJEU judgments that contradict the position of the ECtHR, also 
because CJEU judges and référendaires are (still) concerned with preventing an open conflict with the 
ECtHR.138 The current President of the CJEU, Lenaerts, recently referred to the ECtHR as ‘a valuable 
ally’ from which the CJEU draws inspiration leading to a ‘constructive dialogue’ and ‘cross-
fertilization’.139  
It is not surprising that Opinion 2/13 is not a game changer, because it is logical that the CJEU, 
after having given such a heavy blow towards the ECHR system in its Opinion, exercises some caution 
and damage control by giving the impression that it is not hostile towards the ECtHR. This could 
especially be said about Aranyosi and C.K. where the CJEU departed from Opinion 2/13 and reconciled 
                                                 
133 Above n x. 
134 J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 817; Douglas-Scott, for example, labeled the practice as ‘messy, unpredictable and complex’, 
while De Búrca pointed to the ‘increasingly selective’ use of the Strasbourg case law and the ‘detached, autonomous and 
potentially uninformed case law’ of the Court of Justice with respect to fundamental rights. S DOUGLAS-SCOTT, above n xx, 
657-658 and 665; G. DE BÚRCA, above n xx, 173-174. De Witte likewise referred to the ‘eclectic and unsystematic’ approach. 
B DE WITTE, above n xx, p. 19.  
135 J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 825.  
136 E.g. Case C-398/13 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, ECLI:EU:C:2015:535. 
137 E.g. C-615/13 P, Client Earth, ECLI:EU:C:2015:489, para. 29. In another case the Council relied on the case law of the 
ECtHR with respect to the immunity of international organisations. Opinion of AG Bot in C-146/13, Spain v. Parliament and 
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2380, para. 33 and C-146/13, Spain v. Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2015:298. See also 
Opinion of AG Wahl in C-194/14 P, AC-Treuhand, ECLI:EU:C:2015:350, para. 16; C-201/14, Bara and others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2015:638, para. 46.  
138 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 820; S MORANO-FOADI and S ANDREADAKIS, ‘A report on the 
protection of fundamental rights in Europe: a reflection on the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and the European Court of Human Rights’ (2014), <dm.coe.int/CED20140017597>, 43 and 47-48. 
139 K LENAERTS, above n xx, p. 839-840. 
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the principle of mutual trust with fundamental rights fully in line with the case law of the ECtHR. 
Nonetheless, the CJEU relies increasingly on the Charter and its own case law. Almost all interviewees 
and academics noted the tendency at the CJEU to refer less often to the ECHR and the case law of the 
ECtHR after the entry into force of the Charter. This is a trend that already started before Opinion 2/13 
and reflects the earlier mentioned Charter-centrism idea of the EU now having its ‘own catalogue’ of 
fundamental rights.140 Likewise, another trend which seems to have started already before Opinion 2/13, 
but which might have become more prominent after Opinion 2/13, is that Strasbourg is cited with less 
“fanfare” and in a more modest way without elevating the ECtHR to the level of being a prominent 
source of rights. The CJEU has, for example, refrained from referring to the case law of the ECtHR as 
‘a source of inspiration’ or of being of ‘special significance’.141 Nor has it referred to the judgments of 
the ECtHR ‘by analogy’.142 Neither have judgments of the ECtHR been directly relied upon as if it they 
are similar to the CJEU’s own judgments.143 The more humble role of the EC(t)HR also reflects the 
‘hierarchy’ in Article 6 TEU, which refers to the Charter in the first paragraph, while the supplementary 
role of the ECHR as general principles of EU law is listed in the third paragraph.144    
The Charter-centrism will most likely continue, since the redrafting of the agreement on the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR will undeniably take a long time.145 It is increasingly questioned 
whether accession will ever happen, even though the President of the European Commission Juncker 
held in April 2016 that accession is a political priority for the Commission. He added: ‘It is also a 
personal commitment. We are working on a solution to that accession and we will not rest until we have 
found a solution’.146 This was, however, before Brexit, which has undeniably moved accession lower on 
the political agenda.147 The Council of Europe Steering Committee for Human Rights, for example, held 
in December 2015 ‘At this time, it remains to be seen when, how and if accession will be completed’ 
(empashsis added).148 The long time needed for negotiation and ratification will in any case be amply 
used by the Court of Justice to develop and bolster its own fundamental rights case law. This is also 
because the existence of the preliminary reference procedure also puts the ECtHR at a disadvantage 
since it enables all national courts to receive guidance on fundamental rights within less than 15 months 
when those courts ask questions about Charter.149 By contrast, without the entry into force of Protocol 
                                                 
140 Interviews as discussed in J KROMMENDIJK, above n xx, 832; Opinion 2/13, para. 170. 
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16 to the ECHR, (the highest) nationals courts cannot turn to the ECtHR for Advisory Opinions and 
have to handle interpretational questions on their own. Because of the growing number of questions on 
the Charter the CJEU will (in some cases) be forced to behave like a human rights court even if the 
CJEU does not consider itself to be such a court.150 The recent EAW judgment of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht is a timely warning for the CJEU that it should not forget its tasks in relation 
to fundamental rights.151 The CJEU’s own self-image or reluctance to see itself as a fundamental rights 
court thus does not entirely reflect its actual practice. As a matter of fact, the CJEU has increasingly 
shown that it is not shying away from acting as the guardian of EU fundamental rights by issuing bold 
judgments in some areas of law, including data protection and privacy (Digital Rights Ireland, Google 
Spain and Schrems) or asylum (N.S. and CK).  
The growing Charter jurisprudence of the CJEU might consequently diminish the felt need to 
accede to the ECHR even more. In addition, it is not unthinkable that some EU Member States will 
become more wary of redrafting the accession agreement in such a way that it complies with all 
“demands” of the CJEU as laid down in Opinion 2/13. This is a monstrous exercise that would basically 
mean that the principle of equality of contracting parties under the ECHR should be dropped in order to 
preserve the specific characteristics and autonomy of EU law.152 This would grant the EU a more 
favourable position under the ECHR than the other States Parties, which would undoubtedly result in 
similar requests from other States Parties to the ECHR or be used as justification for their non-
compliance with the ECHR or judgments of the ECtHR. This would thus erode the ECHR regime. It 
remains to be seen whether EU Member States truly want to go down that bumpy road and whether they 
consider that the gains of an EU accession to the ECHR outweigh these risks involved. This is even 
more so, because the ECtHR is in practice already dealing with many EU law issues.153  
In sum, Opinion 2/13 has to date not really been a game changer, but this might be different in 
several years’ time when looking back in hindsight. 
                                                 
150 See also AG Bot in Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU, Pál Aranyosi (C-404/15) and Robert Căldăraru (C-659/15 PPU), 
ECLI:EU:C:2016:140, para. 175; D SARMIENTO, ‘The German Constitutional Court and the European Arrest Warrant: The 
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international law. J MALINOVSKÝ, ‘L’adhésion de l’U.E. a la Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme’ (2015) Revue 
générale de droit international public 705, 739. J POLAKIEWICZ, ‘Europe’s multi-layered human rights protection system: 
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